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 A​bstract 
The purpose of this study is to explore the concept of postmodernism as it applies to the 
innovative process as carried out in the 21​st​ century.  In doing so, this study compares and 
contrasts two countries within a region of the world with differing innovative capacities and then 
link these differences to their different engagements with the forces that characterize what 
scholars have terms “postmodernism”. From this study we find that countries that are more 
closely engaged with these postmodernist forces thrive as 21​st​ century innovators; those that are 
less engaged –i.e., have trouble transitioning from the old “modernist” ethos—falter as engines of 
technological change.  In order to better understand the innovative structures of these countries, 
this study compares these countries with two exemplars: Silicon Valley as representative of the 
new world of postmodernism and New England’s Route 128 (near Boston) as the region too tied 
to “modernism” and unable to transition to the “postmodernist” mentality, which has left it “in the 
dust” as a once-promising area that never truly fulfilled its potential. Methodologically, this study 
probes these themes by exploring how history and culture intersect to create an innovative ability, 
or lack of, within a country, using Denmark and Finland as examples. AnnaLee Saxenian’s book 
Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128​ compares two 
regions of the United States and their ability to innovate. The text looks at the nexus of history 
and culture in the two respective regions of the Silicon Valley in California and Route 128 in 
Boston. I will be applying the same analysis to the two countries of Scandinavia, discussing the 
conflict between bureaucracy and egalitarianism. As an academic and business professional, I was 
motivated to construct this study due to my intrigue of the perplexity of business cultures, aspects 
of cultural immersion, particularly in Scandinavia, and a need to understand cultural barriers. 
The goals of this paper include: documenting cultural differences between Denmark and 
Finland based on selections of Saxenian’s ​Regional Advantage​ and analyzing their effects on 
innovation in business. Upon analyzing this theory, the intersections of history, culture, and 
innovation between Denmark and Finland can be compared to the Silicon Valley and Route 128 
in the Saxenian Model, proving excellent country cases for showcasing the effects on the 
innovative competition and growth, and business culture. In turn, this study sheds light on 
innovation today and suggests the nature in which each respective nation conducts business. 
Cultural immersion, primary and secondary research, and interviews are included in the 
building of this study. Data was collected from a multitude of business forums, supporting data 
from Hofstede’s Cultural Dimensions Theory, guided interviews, and participant observations. 
The researcher characterizes cultural understanding as a continuous development which only 
further benefits international relationships and globalization.  
 Sources and Methodology 
This study is composed of both qualitative and quantitative data. I have gathered a large 
portion of primary and secondary research from Denmark and Finland, having both visited and 
worked in both countries. I spent my time in Scandinavia exploring culture, history, and business 
structures through a multitude of interviews with business professionals and those who have 
worked in the public sector. This cultural immersion has not only inspired this study, but offered a 
first-hand experiences. I also toured a variety of history museums and art exhibits that shed light 
on the organizational structures of each country respectively. Other sources include public sources 
published by the national government of Finland and Denmark, the companies explored in the 
case studies, and the cultural perspectives of other authors, including Geert Hofstede.  
In regards to this study, there are limitations and issues to be explored. The study provides 
a large amount of qualitative insight into the innovation management processes at company levels 
and show many interesting perspectives on innovation and innovation cultures in Danish and 
Finnish context. Generally younger and smaller companies tend to be more open than more 
established organizations, but due to the limited scope of the study it can be difficult to draw 
general conclusions on culture structures  in both Danish and Finnish companies as such. 
However, the study sheds light on a number of relevant elements that it would be interesting to 
study in more depth with the application of other managerial and innovation theories. For 
instance, the method of studying best innovation practices in Denmark limits the knowledge about 
challenges with regard to innovation. It would be very interesting to investigate cases in which 
innovation structures and organizations have failed, and vise versa for Finland.  
Another limitation of the chosen methodology is the bias that may be generated by the 
literary and documentation reading chosen, as well as the possibility of misinterpretation in 
qualitative data research. But, the data in the study obtained from numerous data sources and we 
consider our analysis strong due to the relevance and variety of documentation and data for the 
company case studies. The arguments made illustrate the application of AnnaLee Saxenian’s 
Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 
of regional culture and the power to innovate  in the context of Finland and Denmark. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Revolutions come in different forms.  They may strike suddenly – or at least appear to do 
so—and destroy all the came before it in one fell swoop.  The French Revolution was such a 
cataclysm.  Alternatively, a revolution can come on slowly and in increments.  In this case, it does 
not ride over the existing order all at once.  The old and the new reside side by side for a while. 
They interact through conflict and also sometimes through creative interactions.  There are 
certainly geographical differences, some regions and nations holding on to the traditional way of 
doing things while others latching on to the new, and often benefitting tremendously in being 
 what is considered “modern.”  After all, as Weber reminds us, the industrial revolution seemed to 
take hold stronger in such protestant nations as the UK followed by the US southern Europe 
faltered in their industrialization.  This study is concerned with the co-existence of the old and the 
new, as defined in the 21​st​ century.  For most of the 20​th​ century, the word “modern” has been 
attached to, among other things, a way of producing things.  Another term for it is “Fordism”.  At 
the center of this “modern” system is the large-scale ,geographically confined and concentrated 
integrated plant.   Focused, hierarchical, rigidly intense production within a production “city” 
characterizes Fordism.  Ford’s massive and legendary River rouge plant outside of Detroit serves 
as the prototypical example.  So do the large, integrated petrochemical complexes  that dot the 
Gulf Coast. These are the 20​th​ century artifacts of modernism that we have come to exalt as the 
reasons for American economic greatness in the last century. But the rise of globalization over the 
last few decades has ushered in a new revolution. If modernism in the form of Fordist principles 
encroached on the old ways of doing things –farming and old craft traditions of the 19​th 
century—“postmodernism” in the form of “post- Fordist” systems now is slowly replacing 
modernism that so defined the 20​th​ century.and replacing it over time and across geographical 
space. If local concentration of industry –what we can call “nationalist” production—defined the 
industrialized world in the last century, global dispersal –or “internationalist” production—is 
more and more characterizing business and industry in this present time.  This rise of global 
postmodernist production does not just define existing industrial technology but, as importantly, 
increasingly dictates the rate and direction of innovative activity of nations. That is to say, 
countries –and regions within countries--that embrace and incorporate postmodernist thinking 
into their society tend to be more successful innovators than those who continue to adhere to the 
older modernist (Fordist) model of industrial technology . These countries then are more 1
successful technically and, through new technology, economically than those that remain tethered 
to the old “modernist” way of thinking.  Further, whether a country does embrace postmodernism 
or not depends on that country’s historical and cultural DNA.  Some areas of the world then are 
simply constituted historically and culturally to be more adaptable to the global changes taking 
place in industrial production than are others.  Those left behind, however successful they may 
have been in the now rapidly eroding “modernist” world, cannot seem to adjust easily to the more 
flexible, geographically wide-ranging, organizationally flat and elastic world of the 21​st​ century. 
These firms, rigidly tied to the past, are the ones that find themselves out in the cold, and “bound 
in shallows and in miseries” of the old ways of doing things. 
 This thesis is a study of successes and failures in the new post-modernist world. Using the 
research and model of Annalee Saxenian’s influential book ​Regional Advantage​ as a map from 
which to negotiate an understanding of why certain countries –and regions within countries—are 
1 ​An interesting and insightful case study on the importance of post-Fordist thinking in 
recent innovation concerns, of all things, the mountain bike.  See: Rosen, P. (1993) “The Social 
Construction of mountain Bikes: Technology and Postmodernity in the Cycle Industry,” ​Social 
Studies of Science​ (Vol. 23, No. 3): pp. 479-513.  
 more successful innovators than others, we can place this understanding within the context of 
society’s transformation from a “modernist” approach to the more recent globalist 
“postmodernist” frame.  This study looks at two Scandinavian countries – Finland and 
Denmark—and compares and contrasts their attitudes and reactions to this transformation.  While 
one country (Denmark)is shown to be most receptive to the new worlds of post-modernism, the 
other (Finland) remains mired in the old ways of modernism.  This case study is an excellent way 
to see how very different historical and cultural contexts make big differences in the ability –or at 
least the willingness of countries --even in the same region of the world—to walk confidently 
through the door of post-modernity and thus to embrace the only viable option for succeeding as 
innovators and powerful global economies in the 21​st​ century.  Before proceeding further, it is 
important to first discuss innovation and its relationship with an increasingly global world. 
The Nature of Global Innovation and its Cultural Context 
As we move further into the 21st century, a higher intensity of globalization processes 
have connected the world through trade, technology, the free-flow of information, and 
competition. This has made for a highly globalized world that has lead to an overall general 
growth.  It is undisputed that globalization aspects are affected not only by market forces, but are 
also significantly influenced by political and other microeconomic factors, including historical 
and cultural roots of different countries. But, globalization has revealed variations in geographical 
regions and individual countries that affect growth, and innovation to a large extent. National 
borders, historical backgrounds, geographic size, and cultural subgroups all influence innovation 
and globalization within the context of a country, shedding new light on innovation and 
competition practices.  
Innovation has also produced structural change in networks of competition and 
globalization. The perception of innovation can be described as generated knowledge that 
enterprises and organizations use for enhancing methods, ideas, or products and achieving success 
in the market. Creation of knowledge and research are vital to a nation’s capacity for innovation. 
At the same time, it is not just the ability to generate new knowledge that is important for 
innovation and growth, but also the way in which the knowledge is shared between universities, 
research institutions, and businesses. This means that an innovation system, sustainable at the 
national as well as regional level, plays a most important role in generating economic growth 
(Park, 2005). To encourage innovation, enterprises can receive information from research 
institutes, government authorities, consultants, and universities. Important international 
organizations evaluate various indicators valuable for researching the role of innovation in 
fostering competitiveness and economic growth (the Summary Innovation Index measured by 
Eurostat, the Global Competitiveness Index and Innovation sub‑index prepared by the World 
Economic Forum). Various research studies have emphasized the importance of innovation in 
supporting competitiveness and economic growth on a global scale. The attention to innovation 
 was identified by Adam Smith (1776) in the “An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations”, where he indicated the new group of specialists ready for productivity 
advancement through knowledge. Joseph Schumpeter (1934) highlighted innovation as a 
foundation of economic performance. Many economists continued, revised, and expanded upon 
Schumpeter’s theory. For example,  John Kenneth Galbraith (1967), and Richard Goodwin (1946) 
created a method of economic performance in order to examine the interchange between business 
activities and economic growth. Grossman and Helpman (1991) enhanced growth theory by 
analysing the role of the innovation in fostering economic growth (Terzić, 2017). Their work 
analyzed innovation performance and economic growth in the global economy.  
Innovation often leads to benefits and challenges in both economic and socio-economic 
forms. A classic example of innovation is the development of steam engine technology in the 18th 
century. Steam engines could be utilized in factories, enabling mass production, revolutionizing 
transport in the growing industrial world. More recently, information technology has transformed 
the way companies produce and sell their goods and services, while opening up new markets and 
business models. Innovation is often associated with new enterprises that provide the market with 
new offerings and job opportunities. But, at the same time, innovation can also lead to firm 
closures and job destruction if the products or services become obsolete or are replaced by more 
competitive options. Innovation can also assist and challenge social practices and economic 
growth, health and demographic issues, and social inequalities, among others. As an example, 
innovation can aid elderly individuals in remaining healthy, live independently longer, and 
counteract the declination of physical capabilities that become more prevalent with age. 
Innovation can also provide more personal, predictive and preventive health care products that 
improve the quality of human life. In addition, frugal or inclusive innovations that may be 
inexpensive and simplified versions of existing goods reduce differences in living standards 
between economic and social groups in society. Innovation can address social exclusion and 
benefits that can arise by creating employment opportunities and addressing particular challenges 
faced by lower income groups (The Innovation Policy Platform, n.d.). Innovation has a multitude 
of effects on economies across the globe.  
Cultural, historical, and geographical forces also come into play to influence innovation 
and economic growth, factors that are underestimated in the consideration of accounting for 
current and future demands of innovation. An example can be derived from the development and 
growth of the American nation’s frontier mentality in bringing individuality and risk taking into 
the U.S. psyche and its effect on innovation and economic growth. The Frontier Thesis is the 
argument, advanced by historian Frederick Jackson Turner in 1893, stating that American 
democracy was formed by the American frontier. While the theory is focused on the development 
of democracy, his ideologies can be applied to the growth of the mental capabilities towards 
innovation. He proposed that the stress of moving the frontier line in the early stages of a 
developing America had an impact on the pioneers going through the process. Turner set up a 
 transformative model using the formation of American history and the geographical size of the 
land that was the early United States.  
The first settlers who arrived at the East colonies in the 17th century operated and thought 
like Europeans. They had to adapt to the new physical, economic and political environment in a 
variety of ways; the cumulative effect of these adaptations was the mentality of Americanization. 
Subsequent generations moved further inland, pushing the lines of settlement and wilderness. 
European characteristics failed to continue and the old country's institutions (e.g., established 
churches, aristocracies, intrusive government, and land distribution) increasingly declined. Every 
generation that moved further west became more American, more intolerant of hierarchy, and 
increasingly innovative in their need for survival. They also became more individualistic and 
dependent on organizations they formed themselves. In broad terms, the further west, the more 
American the communities became. In the thesis, the American frontier established liberty and the 
acceptance of risk taking by releasing the newly established Americans from the European 
mindsets and old, dysfunctional customs. The mindset shifts of American settlers forged a new 
people and resulted in the acceptance and desire for competitive and innovative practices, pushing 
new frontiers beyond that of land into commercial business and economic growth. The desire to 
explore new boundaries, geographical, industrial, and overseas expansion “was not carried in the 
Susan Constant to Virginia, nor in the Mayflower to Plymouth. It came out of the American 
forest, and it gained new strength each time it touched a new frontier," states Turner. The 
American mentality has carried throughout the decades into today’s innovation sectors. 
The historical influence of the American mentality, among many other factors, contributed 
to the United States becoming one of the innovative leaders in the world today. Each nation 
possesses unique frontier experiences in their formation and development, resulting in a variety of 
differing government policies, cultural practices and traditions, mentalities, and innovation and 
economic growth. By contrast, less innovative countries also differ culturally and historically 
from the United States in their innovative and developmental efforts. Factors of colonization, 
independence, war and civil strife, religious and governmental influence all play a role. Countries 
like Egypt and Israel, for example, have both faced their fair share of historical conflict and 
development as nations. But, even though these countries are geographically neighbors and in 
large part shared similar histories, they have evolved drastically contrasting innovation and 
competitive systems. Israel has developed extensive innovation and entrepreneurial clusters and 
ranked in the top 25 of both the 2017-2018 Global Competitiveness Report (24th) and the Global 
Innovation Index (17th), while Egypt has fallen behind, ranking 115th in competitiveness out of 
138 countries and 105th in innovation out of 127 countries. Why has Egypt, which has had great 
difficulty in pursuing a post-modernist approach to innovation,   lagged behind in terms of 
scientific, innovative, and competitive development, in contrast to Israel's achievements –a 
country it might be argued has been far more open to globalist post-Fordist ways of thinking-- and 
its high global ranking in entrepreneurship and inventions? There are a variety of answers to the 
reasons Egypt has not taken advantage of their resources to establish advanced innovation 
 institutions, including differing cultural and historical backgrounds and practices from the 
surrounding countries and the mentality/attitudes it produces in the citizens who live there, but it 
is important to note is the level of regional variation that exists in the same geographical region. 
The same regional variation can be applied within a singular country as well. This brings 
into discussion that even within countries, one can see historical/cultural/geographical differences 
that result in different levels of innovation and economic growth. Looking at Germany for 
example, more specially the differences between Northern and Southern Germany, one can see 
variation in cuisine, dialect of language, drinking habits, religion, geography, and socio-economic 
structures of the two regions. In 1989, Germany celebrated the reunification of a country divided 
since World War II with the destruction of the Berlin Wall. But, even though the Allies split up 
Germany between East and West in the aftermath of World War II, the recognized real 
differences between Germans, as one will hear in Munich as well as Hamburg, isn’t between East 
and West, but between the more globalized North and the less internationally-oriented South. 
Differences have emerged in their innovation structures and economic growth. In the 2016 reports 
from The IDW (Institute of Public Auditors in Germany, Incorporated Association), Federal 
Employment Agency, Initiative Neue Soziale Marktwirtschaft, and DAX, Southern Germany has 
shown increasingly growing prospects over that of the Northern states. Southern German states 
has seen an increase of approximately 1.3 million in population in 1990. Southern states rank 
lower in insolvencies (49,895 compared to 72,619 in the North), unemployment (1.0mil compared 
to 1.7mil), and debts to other countries (€170bn compared to €371bn).  The South ranks higher in 
GDP per person (€39,481 compared to €34,967 in the North), exports (€558.8bn verses €390.9bn 
in the North), and patents registered (34,782 verses only 13,692), exhibiting factors of greater 
innovation and economic growth. It appears that states of Southern Germany go to better schools, 
express more job opportunity, earn more, and live longer. Their local governments have healthier 
finances to invest more, sometimes five times as much as in the North (Bremen, Dresden, 2017). 
This regional variation within a country can essentially be applied to every country to exhibit the 
differences that result in varying levels of innovation and fiscal improvement.  
This leads to the application of AnnaLee Saxenian’s book ​Regional Advantage: Culture 
and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128​ and the comparison of the regions of the United 
States and their ability to innovate. History normally has distinguished the regional variation of 
the innovative North versus the backwards South in 19​th​ century. Saxenian’s book discusses the 
contrasts between today’s West coast Silicon Valley and the East coast Route 128. In the 1980’s, 
the two regions appeared similar in their mixture of large and small technology firms, ivy league 
universities, military funding, and venture capital opportunities. If anything, Route 128 was more 
widely recognized for their association with technology than the Silicon Valley. So then why is it 
that business in the Silicon Valley flourished while Route 128 declined moving into the 1990’s? 
The answer, Saxenian asserts, has to do with the fact that despite similar histories and 
technologies, Silicon Valley developed a decentralized but cooperative industrial culture while 
Route 128 came to be dominated by independent, self-sufficient corporations. Saxenian states that 
 the Silicon Valley had a unique dynamism about it. Extensive professional networks, willingness 
and acceptance to take risks, openly exchanged information, job hopping, and an egalitarian 
environment, openness to global companies –in other words a definite post-modernist world-- 
gave the area an undeniable competitive advantage in entrepreneurship and innovation. The 
Silicon Valley’s culture supported entrepreneurial experimentation and collective learning. 
Silicon Valley’s organizational structure was in deep contrast to that of Route 128. Large, 
vertically integrated, and enigmatic corporations dominated within the boundaries of the area. The 
connections with almost exclusively large corporations limited growth and innovation, 
emphasizing the hierarchical promotion over collaboration. Silicon Valley’s interest in local 
networks, innovative thinkers, and educational institutions were far more attractive than their east 
coast counterparts who focused more on tradition and established firms, drawing new talent and 
global business professionals towards the West instead of the East. 
As a result of these differing cultural and organizational worlds –with Route 128 adhering 
to the hierarchical, insulated, geographically isolated, mechanized mentality of the “Fordist” 
universe--  Route 128 fell behind in the shift of technology as the focused moved from 
minicomputers to personal computers. Silicon Valley on the other hand, adapted to the changing 
market, diversifying their range of products and systems with chips, routers, application 
softwares, and ecommerce. Today the Silicon Valley remains one of the leading locations for 
technology innovation and venture activity both nationally and on a global scale. Saxenian’s 
pioneering research into the dynamics and regional variation of competition offers a compelling 
analysis of the importance competition and innovation need to answer the individual local terms 
and outcomes of a region, as well as maintain competitiveness in frontier industries when the 
country is already at the forefront as a result.  With the aim of determining interconnections 
between the variables of innovation, competitiveness and growth through historical and cultural 
roots, the application of utilization of Saxenian’s work helps corporations, regions, and countries 
find a competitive advantage in a volatile world economy. 
It is widely accepted that innovation adapts in developed economies and leads to growth 
in the global markets. Looking more in depth at the nations of Northern Europe, the Nordic 
countries have some of the most developed regional dimensions of innovation policies and 
institutions. The countries Finland and Denmark have developed innovation strategies and 
respective instruments that have been recognized in global context. For example, the Capital 
Region of Denmark has its strategy ‘The Capital Region of Denmark: The Green, Innovative 
Growth Engine of North Europe’ and similar strategies that have been employed in the regions of 
Sweden and Finland. While Scandinavia is considered highly innovative and has top-ranked in 
such aspects in the past decade, regional variations exist between the countries, including within 
the historical and cultural contexts discussed earlier. These regions are considered to be important 
players in global  innovation systems and prove to be excellent cases to apply Saxenian’s theory 
of regional advantage in a globalized scenario. It’s important to note when examining how people 
from different cultures relate to one another, what matters is not the absolute position of either 
 culture on the scale but rather the relative position of the cultures (Meyer, 2014). In regards to this 
study, Denmark is comparable to “postmodernist” Silicon Valley and Finland with “modernist” 
Route 128. Similar to the question of competitive advantage in the regions of the United States, 
we ask why has Denmark adapted successfully to changing patterns of international competition 
and innovation while Finland appears to be losing its competitive edge. This paper seeks to 
answer this question as well as explore independently the interconnections of histories and 
cultural practices of both countries, their effects on the innovative competition and growth, and 
business culture today. 
Examining both Denmark and Finland within the context of Saxenian’s theory will 
demonstrate why companies like Nokia, a Finland native, which quickly garnered market share 
initially, followed the path of Route 128’s decline and flat lined in innovation and competition 
while companies like Apple and Samsung surpassed them. Denmark in contrast, appears to be 
thriving in the technology industry, taking innovation to new heights through competition and 
collaboration. This study will uncover the source of differentiation in innovation ideals between 
the two nations. As the world shifted from modernist to postmodernist, the model of innovation 
and production that Nokia used to gain competitive advantage in decades past no longer worked. 
Competitive advantage required a post modernist way of behaving, one more flexible, flat, 
collectivist  and globally oriented.  The underlying reasons for these differences lies in their very 
different historical and cultural experiences, experiences that began to emerge centuries past. 
The focus in Denmark lies in the understanding of how Viking community ideals 
influenced the egalitarian behaviors of Danish culture and contributed to innovation. The Danish 
Law of Jante will also come into focus as the study will investigate the unspoken cultural rule 
written by Danish author Aksel Sandemose. This rule has major influence on the cultural identity 
and tends to pull Denmark more towards collectivist ideals that influence innovation policies and 
practices. The belief lays with the idea that individuals are to be considered equal and 
achievements are to be downplayed as a part of Scandinavian culture. The law states: 
You're not to think ​you​ are anything special. You're not to think ​you 
are as good as ​we​ are. You're not to think ​you​ are smarter than ​we​ are. 
You're not to convince yourself that ​you​ are better than ​we​ are. You're 
not to think ​you​ know more than ​we​ do. You're not to think ​you​ are 
more important than ​we​ are. You're not to think ​you​ are good at 
anything. You're not to laugh at ​us​. You're not to think anyone cares 
about ​you​. You're not to think ​you​ can teach ​us​ anything (Sandemose, 
1933). 
This idea has root in Danish culture, holding its members to a set of societal standards. 
One should not boast about their accomplishments which may set them apart. Citizens do not 
wear flashy jewelry or drive fancy cars to demonstrate wealth. In fact, walking throughout the city 
 of Copenhagen, one can see a sea of blacks and greys. While it is a part of the minimalist lifestyle 
the Danes have adopted, it also stems from the Law of Jante and the value of homogeneity. 
Finland, in contrast, is not culturally considered a part of Scandinavia, but is a part of the 
larger Nordic region. Denmark, Sweden, and Norway share a common Scandinavian root 
language and a common Viking history, based on North Sea and Northern European traditions, 
linked to Germany and England. Finland, however, shares the linguistic roots with Estonians and 
Hungarians, which is very different from the Scandinavian roots and languages, and originates 
from central Asia. The people of Scandinavia emerged from northern Europe, while the people of 
Finland emigrated from the East. Like their Hungarian cousins, who differ from their Slavic 
neighbors ethnicity but share some culture and traditions, Finns today share more cultural traits 
with the Nordic countries than with their eastern neighbors (Cultural Advice, 2005). Finland, 
leaning more towards bureaucratic than collectivism in social ideals, is affected by Eastern 
European influence. Finnish nationalism has developed from cultural and linguistic origins with 
the influence of Russian ideals. The protection of the land in Finland is rooted in historical 
developments, the beginnings of which traced to the latter part of the eighteenth century. It was 
then that the idea of Finnish national separateness began to gain traction and other studies of the 
Finnish people began to contribute to the rise of modern nationalism and eventually the 
consciousness of cultural unity. This also lead to the notion of Finns being a more taciturn and 
conservative people. 
In addition to differing backgrounds and social structures, cultural and individual 
differences are often wrapped up with differences among organizations, industries, professions, 
and other groups (Meyer, 2014). Initial differences in social structure and industrial practices laid 
the foundation for the creation of distinct innovation systems. These institutions shape and 
continue to be shaped by the local culture and the shared understanding and practices that unify a 
community, defining everything from labor market behavior to attitudes toward risk taking. A 
region’s culture is not static, but rather is continually reconstructed through social interaction. No 
single dimension adequately accounts for the adaptive capacity of a regional competitive 
economy, nor is any single variable prior or causal of the others. Regional culture is important, 
but is not alone decisive in promoting innovation forums (Saxenian, 2005). This is to be 
considered with high regard in the context of this study. 
Chapter 2: The Saxenian Model 
AnnaLee Saxenian has, in ​Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley 
and Route 128,​ made significant contributions to the historical understanding of the American 
high-technology industry and mechanics of technological innovation growth. A professor at the 
University of California, Berkeley, Saxenian sought to uncover how regional economies figure 
into industrial and innovative success and failure in the late 20th century. Her research indeed 
illustrates two divergent paths of industrial growth and technological advancement in the two 
 coastal regions of the United States, clarifying the less than rigid culture of the American 
industry. 
Saxenian’s research is ethnographic in nature, with the empirical material accumulated 
over of the course of nearly a decade of immersion and observation in the two regional 
economies. Her core of the argument is built from more than 160 in-depth interviews with 
entrepreneurs, industry leaders, corporate executives, and representatives of local business 
associations, governmental organizations, and universities in Silicon Valley and Route 128. 
Regional Advantage also draws heavily from the industry and trade press, both local and national, 
corporate documents and numerous public and private databases, and from the County Business 
Patterns which was published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (Saxenian, 2005). Her hypothesis 
proposes the Silicon Valley’s growth and success in the late 1990’s can be attributed to the 
region’s decentralized organizational culture, cooperative exchange traditions, and the value 
placed on risk taking. In opposition, Route 128 on the East coast fell behind in technological 
progress due to their hierarchical and independent industrial systems. The histories and 
organizational cultures highly influenced the outcomes of both regions, causing one to flourish 
and the other to fall to the wayside. 
With Route 128’s historical links back to New England, flourishment in Massachusetts 
was almost inescapable. Building on history, capital, and technology, the region quickly became a 
leader in new technical knowledge, launching early startups like Teradyne, Computervision, and 
later the MIT Radiation Laboratory at MIT, beginning an era of substantial government R&D 
funding which expanded public and private organizations in radars, computing, and new 
technology. The identities of the corporations and persons of the region were shaped largely by 
the hierarchical and authoritarian ethics of Puritanism, and continued to influence the emphasis of 
family, class backgrounds, and location in a well-defined social hierarchy. Most of the New 
England population resided in stable communities and neighborhoods that were often home to 
families reaching back multiple generations. These longstanding ties to community ensured a 
strict separation between work and social life among its engineers and innovators (Saxenian, 
2005). Through the 1980’s, firms began to inherit and reproduce industrial order based on the 
independent, autarkic structures in organizations, adopting the strategies of earlier East Coast 
generations (Saxenian, 2005). The region’s location and concentrations of capital, skill, and 
technology had Route 128 poised for growth, but proved to be slow to changing markets and 
technologies moving into the 1990’s.  New England’s traditional outward-looking mentality to be 
expected by a community that lived on seafaring trade has rigidified and turned in on itself.  Its 
most advanced technological region –route 128—had become rigidified, bureaucratic and insular; 
places mile MITRE retained close association with government agencies and with a certain level 
of self-satisfaction showed the clear signs of “not-invented-here” syndrome and the lack of 
interest in outside talent or ideas, whether they emanated from other companies or other countries.  
According to Saxenian, Route 128 never reached its promised prosperity due to the 
emphasis on such Fordist characteristics as corporate secrecy, vertical integration, formal 
 hierarchies While it did provide the area the with stability that is critical in an environment of 
volume markets and price-based competition –that is, it was inadequate for the accelerating the 
pace of technological and market change in up-and-coming technology (Saxenian, 2005). The 
East Coast business culture had produced an environment where employees were generally 
expected to stay for the long term, working their way up the corporate hierarchy and retiring with 
a comfortable pension (Saxenian, 2005). This resulted in some of the lowest employee turnover 
rates in the computer industry, reinforcing isolation and employee loyalty to individual firms over 
the industry as a whole (Saxenian, 2005). These internal organizational structures emphasized 
status, corporation loyalty, and the avoidance of taking risks, and did little to cultivate the strong 
regional or industry-based loyalties that unified the members of the Silicon Valley’s technical 
community (Saxenian, 2005). The firms of Route 128 were too disciplined to the point of 
organizational rigidification and stifling specialization –echoing the inflexible, difficult to change 
Fordist production factory  – making them unable to respond to the innovation emerging from the 2
opposite coast of the country. 
The Silicon Valley entrepreneurs were post modernists in many respects. They saw 
themselves as pioneers forging a new industrial settlement in the natural boundaries of the 
California peninsula. Interestingly, the person who figured prominently in creating a post 
modernist industry that was decentralized with interconnected firms and flexible R&D production 
systems was actually a person who was active in the years before and following World War II, 
Frederick Terman, who Annalee Saxenian mentions as creating the 20th century technical 
community (Saxenian, 1995). A professor at Stanford, Turner worked to build up Stanford 
University's program in electronics and electrical engineering, encouraging faculty and graduates 
to start businesses locally. These ideals eventually evolved to create the diversitied fabric of 
external relationships and supplier infrastructures that helped the Silicon Valley excel in 
specialization and experimentation (Saxenian, 2005). One of the first and most famous firms to 
embrace the open and inclusive networks in the Silicon Valley was Hewlett-Packard. The firm 
founded on the basis of an audio-oscillator invented by William Hewlett and developed by David 
Packard under the guidance and encouragement of Terman at Stanford University. 
Silicon Valley evolved an industry that did not resemble most of the American economy, 
especially the East Coast, in that they ditched organizing around self-sufficiency and the 
hierarchical corporation structures that were predominantly independent to the surrounding 
environment.​ ​They instead adopted a decentralized organizational system in which firms 
2 ​The inflexibility of Route 128 is reminiscent of Henry Ford’s rigidified assembly line 
system that defined the “modernist” system.  As David Hounshell in his book ​From the American 
System to Mass Production ​tells us, Ford found it extremely costly and too consuming to try to 
impose model changes into his factor, a factory geared to making only one standard product, the 
Model T. (See Hounshell, D.(1985) ​From the American System to Mass Production​ ​1800-1932: 
The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Studies in Industry and 
Society)​(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press). 
 specialized and competed intensely, but while still collaborating in informal ways with one 
another and local institutions to gain insight about changing markets and technologies. With such 
a strong link to local and competing firms, corporations in the region were distinguishably 
showing unusually high levels of job hopping, the rates of mobility forcing firms to compete 
fiercely for experienced talent. Most firms eventually came to accept high turnover as a normal 
cost of business in the region (Saxenian, 2005). The evolution of Silicon Valley firms thus relied 
heavily on the interconnections of local social and technical networks and as well as their own 
individual activities for competition and growing innovation. 
Saxenian asserts the Silicon Valley’s success was attributed to the inclusive and 
decentralized networks that developed among managers, entrepreneurs, and executives on 
multiple levels, and the continual shuffling of employees within various firms to reinforce the 
value of personal relationships and networking. The pioneers of the Silicon Valley explicitly 
sought to avoid the hierarchical structures of the East Coast companies, developing stronger 
commitments to one another and to the cause of advancing technology than to the individual 
companies or industries (Saxenian, 2005). The contrasting values and practices of the Silicon 
Valley from Route 128 proved beneficial in their rise as innovation leaders in the mechanical and 
technological industries. 
Companies from both regions continued to compete for market value through 
technological advancement, despite their differentiating regional business cultures. Intel 
Corporation, from Silicon Valley, and Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC), from Route 128, 
fought vigorously in the field of semiconductor microchips and computer systems. Intel, however, 
eventually became more successful even though DEC was the older and considered more 
respectable company. Both companies reflect Silicon Valley and Route 128 perfectly in their 
representation. 
The Intel Corporation focused on manufacturing chipsets, flash memory, embedded 
processors and other devices related to communications and computing. But by 1985, Intel 
abandoned memory production, dramatically increasing its pace of new product introduction and 
by the end of the decade had revitalized its microprocessor business (Saxenian, 2005). During the 
1990s, Intel invested heavily in new microprocessor designs, fostering the rapid growth in the 
computer industry. Intel became the dominant supplier of microprocessors for PCs and was well 
known for innovative maneuvers in response to its market position during this time. 
Intel had early advantages through Silicon Valley connections by joining the  Santa Clara 
County Manufacturing Group (SCCMG) in the 1970’s with David Packard, chairman of 
Hewlett-Packard.  The formation for the SCCMG centered around the strong belief that the future 
of the electronics industry was directly related to the future of the Silicon Valley. The twenty-six 
founding members, including both electronics, non-electronics companies, and banks,  aimed to 
work “side-by-side” (Saxenian, 2005). Intel’s encouraged openness facilitated the exchange of 
ideas and information through these organizational structures. 
 The rapid expansion of  Intel contributed to the creation of more than 200,000 net new 
technology employment (Saxenian, 2005). Intel became to be known within Silicon Valley for its 
attention to managing people as well as technology. They were seen as a model of good 
management that encouraged excellence through competitive achievement. Intel founders Robert 
Noyce, Andy Grove, and Gordon Moore focused on recruiting recent graduates of engineering 
schools rather than experienced managers, believing that employees would develop a passionate 
commitment to the firm’s goals and make appropriate decisions unencumbered by layers of 
management (Saxenian, 2005). They also encouraged unity in the firm’s vision and community 
through the avoidance of such Fordist concepts as social hierarchies, bureaucratic boundaries, and 
siloed specializations. Within Intel’s office spaces reserved parking spaces, executive offices and 
dining rooms were nonexistent. Offices consisted of rearrangeable partitions where everyone, 
including the founders, worked in the same space to promote discussions of new ideas and 
problem solving. The decentralization of Intel continued through the level of autonomy and 
responsibility given to all levels of management. 
During this time period, Silicon Valley companies were growing faster than those along 
than those along Route 128. By 1990, 39 of the top 100 fastest growing electronics companies in 
the nation were based out in Silicon Valley and only 4 were based on Route 128. Intel ranked 
among the fastest-growing enterprises in 1990. CEO of Whitehorn Group, Christopher Johnson, 
commented on the growth of Silicon Valley corporations, including Intel, stating that, "given their 
history of organic and strategic development, these companies have both the foresight and 
resources to make large acquisitions, take risks to deliver the market valuations which, in turn 
attracts the flow of venture capital that drives innovation" (Marketwired, 2014). Intel, utilizing 
Silicon Valley ideals, quickly became a household name in the American economy. 
Although Intel was not clear of trouble between 1970 and 1990, they recovered more 
quickly from loss in the memory markets, largely due to their control of the profitable 
microprocessor market and their model of flexible R&D and manufacturing, corporate autonomy 
and self-reliance and ultimately the services of foreign (Asian) production facilities through 
strategic outsourcing of chip manufacture. Intel, among the other Silicon Valley firms, continued 
to rely on local patterns of inter-firm mobility and exchange. These relationships ultimately 
facilitated the recovery through technology market changes and adjustments in the regional 
economy (Saxenian, 2005). Corporations of Route 128 demonstrate a contrasting adaptation to 
the changing market needs.  
The Digital Equipment Corporation, headquartered in Massachusetts and representative of 
the old-style “modernist” approach to innovation characterized by large, hierarchical, fully 
integrated operations,  was never able to recover from the technological market shifts between the 
1970’s and 1990’s. The world increasingly required successful  DEC began designing and 
manufacturing its own integrated circuits in 1976. But already in 1959 DEC introduced the 
Programmed Data Processor, the first commercially available general-purpose computer. With the 
price tag of $120,000, only fifty-three of these computers were  sold. By 1967, however, the firm 
 was producing low-cost minicomputers in large volumes. By 1977, with revenues exceeding one 
billion dollars, DEC easily led the market with 41% of worldwide minicomputer sales (Saxenian, 
2005). 
 By 1979, after three years of heavy investment, its internal semiconductor operation had 
increased tenfold in size, making it one of the largest integrated circuit producers in the nation. By 
1983 DEC was building its minicomputers from the bottom up, manufacturing everything from 
microprocessors, disk drives, and circuit boards to monitors, to floppy disks and power supplies. 
DEC even tooled the sheet metal and plastics for its components (Regional Advantage, pg. 97). 
But the vertical integration further narrowed the possibilities of innovation, creating timing and 
coordination issues and locking the sources of supply into its existing technologies and skills and 
eliminated competitive pressure to innovate or control costs (Regional Advantage, pg. 102).  DEC 
was a leading corporation of computer systems and integrated circuits, but quickly fell to the 
rapid rise of the innovative business microcomputer in the late 1980’s that made their internally 
manufactured products obsolete. 
DEC’s organizational structures varied too from that of Intel Corporations and contributed 
to the regional shift to the West. While DEC experimented with non-hierarchical organizations, 
however, the networking and collaborative practices that typified Silicon Valley never became 
part of the mainstream business culture of Route 128, and the region’s new management models 
only partially departed from traditional corporate practices (Saxenian, 2005). Instead, DEC 
implored the popular matrix management model, which was pioneered by DEC itself, for it 
appeared to offer a compromise between the decentralization of their entrepreneurial origins and 
the traditional corporate hierarchies to which they increasingly aspired. In practice, unfortunately, 
these hybrid organizations often created confusion and conflict. They undermined informal 
communications and decision-making processes and distanced management from employees and 
customers (Saxenian, 2005). DEC ended up sticking with traditional, “modernist” corporate 
cultural practices and bureaucratic decision-making processes. 
 DEC’s functional groups eventually grew increasingly insulated from changing market 
demands. The engineering group, still oriented toward highly engineered mid-sized time-sharing 
systems for price-insensitive markets, built costly features into new product that consumers were 
not willing to pay for. Marketing continued to devote most of its efforts to the company’s 
profitable mid-sized computers rather than promoting personal computers. As a result, DEC’s 
early PCs were over engineered, overpriced, and under-marketed (Saxenian, 2005).  DEC was 
ultimately acquired by Compaq, merged with Hewlett-Packard, or sold to Intel. 
By the end of the 1980’s, Route 128 producers had ceded their longstanding dominance in 
computer production to the Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 2005). The contrasting responses of Digital 
Equipment Corporation and Intel to changing competitive conditions in computing illustrate the 
relative strengths of Silicon Valley’s network-based from industrial systems over Route 128’s 
firm-based industrial systems. These two companies contribute and advance Saxenian’s 
hypothesis of the two region’s responses to the changing patterns of competition. 
 Chapter 3: Finland- Independence and Hierarchy  
General Overview 
There is little question that Finland has many important qualities embedded in its history, 
geography and culture that should make it a prime example of an innovating country.  And in 
truth, Finland has demonstrated great ingenuity and purpose in moving ahead technologically 
since the end of World War II. But, as with the once-promising Route 128, Finland finds itself 
facing a changing world and, also like Route 128, those changes requires a shifting toward a 
postmodernist way of thinking, a shift that the country has not been able to negotiate with the 
same speed and dexterity as demonstrated by other nations, such as Denmark. The example of 
Nokia and its fall from grace is a case in point.  But first it makes sense to address some of the 
important geographical, economic and political aspects of Finland through a detailed PESTLE 
analysis.  
Finland's political, economic, social, and other various systems provide excellent insight 
to the general overview of Finnish life and society.  Finland today is in many ways a prime 
example of an advanced, forward-looking industrialized country. Finland has produced a 
reputation as a comprehensive and progressive society, ranking highly in a multitude of global 
studies, e.g the Human Development Index ( scoring 0.895 and 23​rd​  out of 177 countries) and the 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (3​rd​ out of 163 countries). The country 
shows significant achievement in its ability to control corruption and provide a satisfactory life 
for its inhabitants. Finland has also performed notably in terms of Global Gender Gap, which 
capturing the equalities in achievement between women and men. The country shows high 
participation of women active in political and economic life, showcasing Finland’s ability to 
create a positive social climate for women. Finland’s 1995 Act of Equality ensures an equal 
proportion of men and women in public institutions. The provision stipulates that the gender with 
less representation should have at least 40% representation in government committees, advisory 
boards, other corresponding public bodies. 
Finland also has advantages politically and geopolitically that many countries do not. It is 
a democratic republic of 5.5 million people with an extensive welfare system. The country's 
citizens are able to participate in the selection their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and free media. Finland is noted for their military neutrality in their 
election not to join NATO, despite the end of Russia’s influence, but did join the European Union 
in 1995. 
One aspect of the Finnish economy does work against its striving towards innovativeness. 
Finland currently operates through a set of high rate taxes, particularly for high income earners, 
which may make it difficult for the country to attract and hold highly skilled employees. People 
who earn more than E60,800 are taxed at the rate of 32%, which is added to other taxes such as 
 the municipal tax. The personal income tax is added to the municipal tax, church tax and social 
insurance contributions, increasing the tax burden further. These high tax rates may make it 
difficult for Finland to attract talent with the right skills (PESTLE analysis Finland country 
profile, 2008). On the other hand, the country has a reputation for a comprehensive and 
progressive social policy, which has led to one of the highest levels of educational attainment and 
lowest prison incarceration rates in the world. The Finnish government has come out with 
measures to upgrade labor skills by fostering lifelong learning and increasing the number of 
students in vocational training. Finland’s strong investment in higher education and research has 
produced record numbers of doctoral candidates and highly qualified personal, attracting 
investment in high-tech sectors. Finland's strong investment in higher education and research has 
more than made up for its high tax policy so that the country has more people per capita working 
in R&D than any other OECD country (OECD, 2016). 
The cost of labor in Finland is high compared to other advanced European economies, 
such as the United Kingdom, Austria and Germany, but the age of retirement in Finland is one of 
the lowest among the Nordic countries with the opportunity to retire at the age of 63. Around 80% 
of the city’s 20-64-year-old residents are part of the workforce an approximately three-fourths of 
the capital city Helsinki residents work in the municipality where they live. However, the number 
of jobs in Helsinki is 1.3 times the number of its working population, which makes Helsinki 
dependent on external workforce (Assadi et al. , 2016- 2017). The number of unemployed people 
has grown immensely during the global recession that started in 2008, but a positive turn was 
observed in employment figures in December 2016, an indicator that Finland has successfully 
recovered from the global recession. 
The innovation and technology programs of Finland is characterized by the government's 
policy of encouraging the interactions among private companies, universities and academic 
institutes in research and development activities, the high level of R&D intensity, and the 
dominant role of private sector in IT development. The talented labor force educated under the 
Finnish world-renowned education system also contributes to Finland's success (Legislative 
Council Secretariat, 2014). 
Overall then, Finland’s economic, political and social structures should have propelled the 
country as a technological dynamo equal to, if not superior to, Denmark. Yet the country has 
experienced technological decline over the last two decades while Denmark has strengthened as a 
technological leader. The following section takes a closer look at technology clusters and 
innovation generally in Finland and focuses in on the important role of Finland’s government 
policy and incentives for innovation. 
Finland Innovation Systems & Clusters 
Since early 1990s it has been popular to study organizations and institutions of innovation, 
as well as how innovation prospers. All economic, social, political, organizational, institutional, 
 and other factors influencing the development of innovation are called the innovation system, and 
the actions of public bodies influencing it innovation policy (Edquist & Hommen 2008). Finland 
is recognized globally as an innovation leader, with their strengths lying in their international 
scientific co-publications, license and patent revenues and applications, and public-private 
co-publications. Through the 1990s, Finland underwent an economic transformation. Beginning 
the decade in a severe economic depression, Finland boosted globally around the middle of the 
decade to emerge as one of the most competitive economies. This dramatic rise and success in the 
new and growing global framework the result of deliberate government policies aimed at 
fostering economic growth through innovation. Finland operates largely under the concept of a 
national innovation system (NIS), the basis for its technology and innovation policy. The 
country’s innovation movements function through a multitude of key Finnish organizations, 
which include the Academy of Finland, public research and development organizations, the 
National Technology Agency of Finland (TEKES), and capital providers like SITRA. These 
diverse ranges of capital and public providers promote the competitiveness of Finnish industry 
and innovation as they assist in and fund research for both start-ups and existing companies 
looking to engage in technology industries. These public and private regional developers, while 
very active, tend to promote cluster development “from above” without intense attention given to 
assuring close interactions between startups, universities and entrepreneurs. 
In recent years, innovation performance in Finland has decreased since 2010, with a small 
increase in 2014, followed by a decrease in 2015. Finland's performance relative to the European 
Union has also been declining from its peak of 134% in 2008 to 124.5% in 2015 (​European 
Innovation Scoreboard 2016 - Finland​, 2016). There has been concern about the level of 
competitiveness and innovation of Finnish industries. Finland has seen a general stagnation or 
decline in international innovations studies, shown in the figure below.  
 
  
Indeed, the economic crisis of the early 1990s, as well as the membership in the European 
Union in 1995 and the European Economic and Monetary Union in 1999, induced a shift in 
Finnish policy thinking: greater emphasis was put on long-term microeconomic as opposed to 
short-term macroeconomic policies, in acknowledgement that prosperity is largely created by 
private individuals conducting business activities within national borders (Oy, 2009). But such a 
policy, according to a number of scholars, is actually making things worse for Finland in terms of 
its innovative output. For example, Acemoglu, Aghion, and Zilibotti (2006) oppose this strategy, 
saying that the country should be more focused on the short-term and minimize investment while 
also searching for younger firms and new and better management that interconnects companies on 
a consistent and dynamic basis. 
This in large part means that Finland’s innovation goals, especially as pursued within its 
high-tech cluster communities,  tend to be relatively consumer-oriented and like that of the United 
State’s Route 128 region, reproduce an industrial order based on large, organizationally rigid, 
integrated and isolated independent firms. Sabel and Saxenian (2008) claim that “Finland is at 
risk of becoming a victim of its economic success,” based as it is on large, integrated companies 
mass producing standardized products. They conclude that “… prospects of longer term growth in 
Finland will require rethinking… [The system] that fuelled successful innovation… appears to 
have become self limiting in the global environment of the 2000s” (Sabel and Saxenian, 2008). In 
other words, the authors confirm that Finland’s “modernist” thinking is increasingly at odds with 
the more globalist, flexible and interconnective post- Fordist world. Few firms in Finland can 
challenge Nokia as the preeminent case study to encapsulate what has been going on in the 
Finnish economy over the last few decades: a rising, high-technology company incorporating all 
of the essential elements of the modernist (i.e., Fordist) system that it worked very well for a time. 
 But as the global economy changed and increasingly required companies to incorporate 
post-modernist business structures to succeed, Nokia’s rigidified regime did not allow it the 
flexibility to change with the fast-moving high-tech times. In short order, it became nothing more 
than a lumbering, slow-moving giant unable to wrest competitive position from its fast moving 
and more nimble post-modernist competitors. 
Case Study: Nokia 
The analysis of the Nokia Corporation’s rise and fall during the 1990s through early 2000s 
allows for further comparison of Saxenian’s Route 218 region. The study of the Nokia 
corporation becomes an important research topic due to its symbolic position in Finnish society as 
well as in the application of Saxenian. Although Nokia has received global attention, the 
consequences of its success and failure were most important in Finland, where it had become a 
symbol of professional management and innovativeness (Lamberg, Laukia, & Ojala, 2014). When 
Nokia became the opposite, the societal effects of that transformation were magnified because 
Nokia’s oft-imitated management practices –practices that reflect older modernist ideas-- were 
suddenly questioned (Laamanen, Lamberg, Vaara, 2016). 
Nokia experienced two distinctive periods in its history: its strategic rise to leadership in 
the mobile telephone industry in the 1990s; and the erosion of its market position after 2006 as a 
consequence of regime-changing business model innovations by competition like Apple, 
Samsung, and Google (Laamanen, Lamberg, Vaara, 2016). Similarly, Saxenian asserts that the 
Route 128 region was in a position for growth and leadership, but also proved to be slow to 
changing markets and technologies. While Route 128 did provide the eastern U.S. region the with 
stability that is critical in an environment of volume markets and price-based competition, it was 
inadequate for the accelerating the pace of technological and market change in up-and-coming 
technology (Saxenian, 2005). Companies like DEC examined earlier, and other companies of the 
region seemingly followed the same downfall as Finland’s Nokia while competitors gained the 
competitive advantage through their focus on innovation and strategic ability. 
Founded in 1865, the Nokia Corporation is a Finnish provider of multinational 
telecommunications, information technology,  software, services and advanced technologies and 
licensing. Throughout the early 1980s and early 1990s Nokia built and sustained leadership in the 
mobile communication industry as a diverse conglomerate. Initially, Nokia grasped essential early 
insights that were critical to their strategic success. The Finnish company took advantage of 
international governments that were likely to to invite new entrants to provide mobile services on 
a commercial competitive basis, and realized full digitalization of networks were on the rise. By 
understanding these two discontinuities, and how the company could benefit from them, Nokia 
was encouraged to commit early to the emerging European digital GSM mobile communication 
standard, to focus on base station development in the GSM European R&D alliance, and to 
eagerly start building relationships with the newly franchised independent mobile network 
 operators (Doz, Kosonen, 2008). During this time, Nokia also made the executive decision to 
focus explicitly on mobile communications and providing high value-added products, above other 
factors of the company. Figure 1 below provides an overview of the key turning points explaining 
Nokia’s success and failure. 
Nokia’s fast international expansion arose from their ability to adapt to differencing local 
demands without losing economies of scale and global integration, while exploring user-friendly 
digital interfaces with excellent designs. Nokia recognized that mobile phones could become mass 
consumer products rather than mere network end as its competitors believed (Doz, Kosonen, 
2008). Early and collective foresight, Nokia’s experience, and the corporation’s culture and 
systems were also used as explanations of success. 
 
 
 
However, Nokia’s success was short-lived, as its ambition to internationalize and diversify 
led to costly acquisitions in electronics and computers, in addition to a series of poor decisions 
made by the corporation, including; the neglect of innovations and products that could have been 
successful, shifting from the opportunistic agility of the early 1990s into a more formal process of 
managing growth, and management’s underestimation how intensely competitive other 
telecommunication businesses were (Doz, Kosonen, 2008). The previously praised strategic 
leadership and organizational capabilities of Nokia had become some of their key sources for 
failure. Scholars offered the following interpretations of Nokia’s decline: “the company did not 
pay sufficient attention to the emotional undercurrents caused by internal competition for 
resources to develop a vast array of phone models” (Huy & Vuori, 2014). Ex-Nokia executive 
 Frank Nuovo highlighted Nokia’s organizational stagnation that results from the combination of 
normal corporate evolution and large size: 
 
 I look back and I think Nokia was just a very big company that started to 
maintain its position more than innovate for new opportunities ... we 
realized at Nokia that touch was increasingly important and were working 
toward doing it, but when a company is really busy holding on to what it 
has built, it is difficult to put enough of a push toward something so 
drastically new and engender urgency in it (Frank Nuovo, 2013). 
 
Nokia had failed to develop its organizational structures, management systems, and 
competences to keep pace with growth and watched as its products became obsolete or less than 
desirable compared to competitor products. They didn’t just struggle to keep up with competitor 
products and prices, but fell short in adapting culturally to the changing, global business 
environment. Apple’s Tim Cook echoed this interpretation in an interview by recalling that 
“Nokia’s internal bureaucracy inhibited efficient software development” (Grobart, 2013). The 
Nokia Corporation aligns with Saxenian’s evaluation of the Route 128 region in how its corporate 
structure and power, or lack of, to innovate play critical roles in the success of a company or 
region. Like that of Route 128, Nokia’s bureaucratic structures characterized by formal 
decision-making procedures and management styles failed to keep up with those willing adopt 
openness and specification in their efforts to innovate, resulting in the loss of leadership in the 
market. Looking at Nokia from the modernist vs. postmodernist perspective, we note the 
company’s adherence to the former and inability to evolve into the latter.  While certainly Nokia 
was  (and is) an international company, it used its global reach most effectively in developing 
mass market for a very limited range of mobile phone options. In other words, it focused the 
company organizationally on making one standard product range and doing this thing very well: 
Efficient production of a product for a large (more or less) homogeneous market.  Like the Ford 
Motor company, especially in its early days, Nokia’s production system –including R&D which 
fed into this system—was very inelastic – it could not readily adapt to changing competition in 
telecommunications thereby allowing other and newer firms the opportunity to take control over 
new generations of telecommunications technology and leave Nokia in the dust. One approach 
Nokia could have taken was to reorganize itself less along hierarchical, bureaucratic lines and 
more along horizontal organizational structures that allowed better intercommunications between 
departments.  Internationally, instead of building mass markets to further lock the company into 
producing one type of product, it could have better leveraged its international position to make its 
production far more flexible –such as through strategic outsourcing—instead of the inflexible, 
integrated production operations that was concentrated mostly within a single plant within 
Finland. Flexibility, custom production for different markets, organizational fluidity, strategic 
global production systems – all of these define the 21​st​ century post-Fordist ways of competing; 
 Nokia failed to cultivate any of these characteristics and so stay mired in the old Fordist world of 
mass production, low cost production and a large homogeneous market.  No wonder it failed to 
thrive in such a dynamic industry.  
 If Nokia reflects Finnish innovation culture as a whole –and this author believe it 
does—we should also not lose sight of the fact that Finland is a very innovative place in many 
respects.  It certainly beats out many nations as na innovator, even if countries like Denmark have 
the edge.  So it cannot be just that Finland is totally mired in the past modernist world and refuses 
to wake up and see the post-modernist world as it is.  Nor can we assume that Finland went off 
the right track just in response to the crises (financial) and opportunities (the EU) of the 1990s. 
Something deeper is going on here.  That “something” of course is Finland’s unique and 
deeply-rooted culture. Looking into that culture a bit deeper will give us a more nuanced 
understanding of Finland’s relationship with the innovative process and technological change.  On 
the one hand, we will see that Finland’s culture has many elements that at least come close to 
post-modernism and that, as a consequence, allow it to continue to be a highly innovative country; 
on the other hand we will also see that, compared to countries like Denmark, its culture is at its 
core fundamentally “modernist” in its values, goals and beliefs and, as such, hindered the country 
from moving into the post-modernist 21​st​ century. This discussion will take place within the 
context of Saxenian’s Route 128 model of technical decline. 
Application of AnnaLee Saxenian’s ​Regional Advantage: Finland and Route 128 
The association of  Finland with Saxenian’s Route 128 is an important point in our 
analysis of innovation within that country.  However, differences in their historical and cultural 
roots as well must be noted and placed in their proper context. Indeed, historical and cultural 
comparisons between Finland and Route 128 are not as black and white. Route 128 had 
longstanding ties to families, neighborhoods, and communities, as the history of the region 
stretched back to the conception of the United States (Saxenian, 2005). Finland, however, had a 
contrastingly complicated history in its formation,  the present borders being the result of a long 
process. Originally joined to the Swedish realm during the Christian conversion, continuous wars 
repeatedly changed Finnish borders, leaving inhabitants in a constant state of in-between. Later on 
in history, Finland became part of the Russian Empire (1809) as the result of international power 
politics, resulting in the disconnection from Sweden and Norway for the first time. While Finland 
was able to keep their own legal and religious systems under Russian rule, they still experienced a 
large amount of uncertainty moving into the 20th century as leaders sought to strengthen Russian 
influences, causing a rise in Finnish protests and civil disobedience. Finland finally gained 
independence in 1917, but was still not exempt from disputes with their bordering neighbors and 
long periods of conflict. What distinguishes Finland from the rest is the rugged nature of the 
climate and location and the historic struggles of the Finns against their East and West neighbors 
in the past. Finland’s Career Guide states: 
 this has made for an equally powerful belief in ideal of the flexible, clever, 
ingenious individual, who can find a way through difficult circumstances. 
Sometimes this strong individualism runs counter to the social welfare goals 
of the larger group, but in most cases, group pressures tend to “normalize” any 
overtly individualist behaviors.  
It should also be noted that Finns have a reputation unlike any other Nordic cultural group, 
with a reputation for reticence, thoughtfulness and the lack of showcasing emotion. They are 
known to be quiet, reflective, somber and, for some, and can appear very stubborn or standoffish. 
They can be unwilling to speak unless they have something important to say. This aloofness is not 
a reflection of authoritarianism or hierarchy: as with their Nordic cousins, Finns believe in very 
egalitarian organizations, aligning here more with Silicon Valley than Route 128. While national 
bureaucracies may be complex, they are not hierarchical. Finnish society is also not overly 
formal; rather it is relatively relaxed, whether in the home or at work (Cultural Advice, 2005). 
Within the business environment, power is decentralized and managers count on the experience of 
their team members, often consulting employees. Anything that emphasizes rank, show or status 
is generally downplayed. The distinction from Route 128 also lays within the environment of the 
Finnish office setting, as it promotes decentralization and equality like the Silicon region. The 
Employment Museum in Helsinki published a series in 2017 on office revolution and 
environment. Viewers can see that  pleasant working environments have become more important 
for many companies operating in Finland. In the creative industries, employees no longer work in 
grey offices, but in aesthetic and playful spaces that are equipped with new technologies. The aim 
is to create a relaxed working environment that promotes communality and creativity. The 
photographs were taken at three game companies that are based in Helsinki – Supercell, Play 
Raven, and Seriously. The offices of these company’s pair imagination with practicality in 
intricate ways, resembling a home-like and inviting atmosphere (Assadi et al. , 2016- 2017). 
While such clear historical and cultural differences do exist between Finland and Route 
128 and which helps to explain Finland’s great innovative capacity vis-à-vis Route 128 –such as 
the flexibility and ingenious individuality, decentralized and pleasant working spaces, etc.-- this 
argument for Finland’s innovative prowess should not be taken too far, as the case of Nokia 
certainly shows. While the formation of both the Finnish and Route 128 regions may differ, both 
resulted in a high preference for avoiding uncertainty and risk. The examination of risk avoidance 
can often correlate with the level of anxiety a country holds. The development of anxiety over 
time, studied by Richard Lynn, followed eighteen countries from 1935 to 1970.  The five 
countries with the highest anxiety scores in 1935 were Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, and 
Japan (the World War II Axis powers). From 1935 to 1950 all countries that had been defeated or 
occupied during World War II (1939-45) increased in anxiety level, while six out of the nine 
countries not defeated or occupied decreased. The overall average was highest in 1950, shortly 
after the war, and then sank to an overall low in 1965, to increase again after that. Lynn’s data 
suggest that national anxiety levels fluctuate and that high anxiety levels are associated with wars. 
 The process as follows: When anxiety levels in a country increase, risk avoidance increases. This 
is noticeable in intolerance, religious and political intolerance, economic or innovative stagnation, 
and all the other manifestations of risk avoidance. Times of war and conflict also pull in the other 
countries, countries in which did not show the same direct results, but did develop increasing 
anxiety because of war threat (House, 2014). Finland has experienced numerous wars, territorial 
disputes, and exchanges of power. It is reasonable to assume the correlation of Richard Lynn’s 
study to that of Finland’s high risk avoidance plays a key role in business culture and innovation 
practices today. Regions exhibiting high uncertainty avoidance are known to maintain rigid codes 
of belief and behavior, and are often intolerant of unorthodox behavior and ideas. There tends to 
be an emotional need for rules, an inner urge to keep busy, and a focus on precision and 
punctuality (Hofstede, 2011). These values align with many of the business cultural practices of 
both Finland and Route 128. The Finnish are known to follow timetables and plans faithfully and 
expect the same of others. Although Finns are careful with the groundwork, they still often make 
decisions quickly. In line with the rest of Nordic culture, punctuality and organization are 
essential, and the climate and historical experiences of Finns in regard to their neighbors make 
Finland a risk-averse culture. 
Looking at values of long- and short-term orientation in Finland, the examination is in 
accordance to the World Values Survey Data, also considering the GLOBE Study’s future 
orientation. Long-term orientation describes the value a culture places on perseverance, thrift, 
ordering relationships by status, and having a sense of shame; while values at the opposite, 
short-term orientation values reciprocating social obligations, respect for tradition, and personal 
steadiness and stability (Hofstede, 2011). Finland falls under the category of short-term 
orientation. It takes time to convince Finns to do something a new way, especially if it runs 
counter to their own experiences (Cultural Advice, 2005). People in Finnish society have a great 
respect for tradition, a relatively small tendency to save for the future, and a focus on achieving 
results quickly. 
 While not all Finnish business cultural practices align perfectly with Saxenian’s 
Route 128, there are significant similarities between the two regions in their respect for tradition 
and risk avoidance, the important role of top-down management and respect for publicly-funded 
“Big Science”(reflected in the important role played by government agencies and their 
subcontracting of large corporations,) the rigidification and slow response time to rapid 
competitive threats,  over-dedication to disciplined management in the service of existing 
technology, and a basically internalized mentality and basically inward-looking and not much 
attuned to using the global production network for Finland’s competitive advantage.  All this is 
reflected in Nokia’s organizational culture and both results in, and follows from, Finnish 
preference for standardized, mass produced goods competing on low prices and incremental 
innovation within an existing production system. 
We will now turn to the case of Denmark and assess its ability and willingness to 
transition from a “modernist” to the “post-modernist” world of the 21​st​ century.  
  
Chapter 4: Denmark- Competition and Community 
General Overview 
Just as we did for Finland, we will first give an overview of Denmark’s macroeconomic 
and social structures.  As with Finland, these indicators show a healthy country and one positively 
aligned with innovation activity.  
Denmark is well known for its efficient system of governance based on the democratic 
principles, mostly governed under the Social Democratic Party, responsible for the large role of 
government in developing a welfare society. In recent years, the center-right coalition of the 
liberals and the Conservative Party, led by past Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has 
taken support from the right wing Danish People’s Party to form the government. The 
government has maintained an effective approach among the coalition partners in passing crucial 
legislation with respect to welfare measures, reduction of taxes and tightening immigration 
regulations. Strengths of Denmark’s political landscape include the impressive performance on 
governance indicators and their continuity of policies. Denmark has continued to perform highly 
in terms of voice and accountability, as well as government effectiveness. 
Further, the Gini Index, which measures income disparity, shows the gap between rich and 
poor in Denmark is one of the lowest in the world (Kingsley, 2012). Government programs are 
tilted towards lessening the social divisions in society, a university education being an excellent 
example. Students are granted a monthly government subsidy to study privately, proving the 
commitment of the state to promote equality. These government subsidies encourage a wider 
social range of backgrounds and economic classes in the classroom, promoting more socially 
conscious and grounded students. This idea of cooperation and equality have deep roots in 
Denmark’s egalitarian business practices and cultural norms. 
Denmark operates under a clear hierarchy of courts, with the Supreme Court at the top. 
The judicial system is based on constitutional laws which guarantee independence, transparency, 
and effective enforcement. Due to the economic freedom of the legal system, conducting business 
comes with ease. The government implemented several reforms to improve the business 
regulatory environment to benefit investment inflows and increase competition. There is also 
openness to foreign investment to further enhance Danish competition. According to the OECD, 
Denmark has one of the highest tax burdens in Western Europe, mostly on individual incomes, to 
support the welfare system that is in place. 
The Danish economy, after the re-growth of the 2008 financial crisis and recession, shows 
a healthy state of government finances. A member of the European Union (EU), Denmark has one 
of the strongest public finance records. The healthy public finance reflects in the country’s low 
debt. While Denmark under the membership of the EU, the currency remains the Danish Krone, 
 which is pegged to the euro. The Danish Financial Supervisory Authority works to monitor banks, 
insurance companies, and players in the securities market, making Denmark one of the few 
countries operating an effective integrated financial regulatory system. Under the control of the 
Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, the systems prove more than effective in monitoring 
activities in all related sectors of the financial system. This access to the various sectors makes it 
easier to spot in discrepancies in one that could create problems for the other. 
A small country in terms of population (approximately 5.7 million in 2018), Denmark has 
successfully developed a prosperous society for its population. As per the human development 
index (HDI), the country ranks 14th in the list of 177 countries, indicative of its impressive 
performance on social development indicators. Further, Denmark ranks 19​th​ out of 144 countries 
in the Gender Inequality Index in 2016, indicating women’s participation in economics and 
political life. Female participation in the labor force is among the highest in Denmark. The public 
sector has dominated the healthcare and education systems of the country, and the taxation policy 
has been hailed as a successful example of redistribution. The Danish welfare system is known 
for its widespread coverage and large scale contribution to the public sectors, including social 
welfare provided for the old, the disabled, and infants. 
Denmark has successfully maintained leadership as innovators. The country’s R&D 
expenditure is well above the EU average. The country ranks at the top position in terms of 
mobile and internet penetrations, and its intellectual property laws and regulations of innovation 
have contributed in the involvement of the technological environment. According to the 2016 
European Innovation Scoreboard, Denmark as an innovation leader, performing above the EU 
average in all dimensions, most notably in open, excellent and attractive research systems, 
entrepreneurship, and intellectual assets. Infrastructure standards in the country also remain high, 
reflecting on its technological advancement. Top priority is given from the government to 
evolving transport networks and funding improvements to existing ones, like the large-scale 
projects of the Oresund Fixed Link (linking Copenhagen with Malmo in Sweden) and the 
Copenhagen metro railway system. Copenhagen’s international airport, Kastrup, which is the 
largest in Scandinavia, is an important hub for international routes and is consistently ranked as 
one of the top airports in Europe for its facilities. (PESTLE analysis Denmark country profile, 
2008). All these factors have contributed in making Denmark one of the most technologically 
advanced countries in the world. 
 We see then that Finland and Denmark, on the macroscale, should both be (more or less) 
equally innovative; for their “Pestles” are (more or less) equally receptive to innovation. Yet we 
know the two countries are not equal in this regard.  We therefore must look deeper into 
Denmark’s society, history and culture to find out why this country has proven so adept at 
navigating the treacherous waters between the “modern” and “postmodern” worlds.  Let’s next 
look at the nature of the country’s innovation system and the general structure of its industrial 
cluster networks.  
 Denmark’s Innovation Systems & Clusters 
While such external forces as economic and political trends does not tell us very much as 
to why Denmark appears to be moving ahead of Finland technically, focusing in on Denmark’s 
technology cluster culture is more useful, for in these progressive centers capture the particular 
and specific cultural attributes of Denmark that are not as evident with the Finnish cluster 
environment.  
Denmark is internationally recognized as a frontrunner in several areas of technology and 
research with global impact. With Denmark’s small geographical size, the country recognizes its 
need to look outward for inspiration and the nation’s citizens readily accept they must do so to 
survive in a global market. A nation's innovation system is shaped by factors like size and 
resource endowments that affect comparatively advantage at a basic level. But it also is true that a 
nation' s innovation system tends to reflect conscious decisions to develop and sustain economic 
strength in certain areas, that is, it builds and shapes comparative advantage (Nelson, 1992). 
There are two national innovation systems that play a large role in Denmark. The Danish 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation focuses on research and innovation policy, and is 
responsible for public research organizations and universities as well as for innovation and 
high-technology business development. The ministry aims to strengthen collaboration between 
the business sector and knowledge institutions.  In order to meet this target, the ministry adopted 
the following four objectives: high mobility and interaction between the business sector, 
universities, and knowledge institutions; high-tech and knowledge-based entrepreneurs; easy 
access to advanced technological knowledge for companies; and increased focus on 
standardization (Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 2002). The other key player in 
Danish innovation policy is The Danish Ministry of Economic and Business Affairs, which is 
engaged in clustering policies and intellectual property issues as well as in efforts to foster 
innovation in traditional industries. Through these innovation systems, strategies like the 
Innovation Strategy have been launched within the country.  The Innovation Strategy: Denmark A 
Nation of Solutions (2012-20), launched in 2012, includes 27 policy initiatives focused on 
research, innovation and education and represents a shift to a demand-driven innovation policy 
approach with an emphasis on enhanced knowledge flows and stronger innovation capabilities in 
education. The Innovation Strategy was complemented in 2015 by the "Growth and development 
in the whole of Denmark" strategy (Vækst og udvikling i hele Danmark) – that intends to foster 
regional growth and development in the country through “regional smart specialization”. The 
program includes more than 100 concrete initiatives focused on strengthening partnerships 
between research institutions and business and intensifying knowledge sharing and innovation in 
businesses (The Innovation Policy Platform, 2016). In Denmark, the internal learning capabilities 
and flexible organizational structures appear extremely important in their organizational and 
innovation systems. 
 The combination of being both a highly individualist and curious nation drives forces for 
Denmark’s reputation within innovation and design. This emerges through the society’s heavy 
consumerism for new and innovative products and the highly creative industries that thrive in it, 
e.g. technology, marketing, financial engineering (itim International, n.d.). Danish designer 
Henrik Vibskov remarked on the globalization of consumerism and ideas stating, “because this is 
a small country, we are focused on what’s going on outside. If something is popular outside 
Denmark, music-wise for example, people accept it inside Denmark. And it’s such a small society 
that if one thing gets accepted, everyone does it (Kingsley, 2012).” Artist Jesper Elg also 
comments on the international outlook taking wave in Denmark is a positive light. He thinks it 
has given his generation wider horizons, making them more ambitious than previous generations, 
throwing out the idea of the Law of Jante to try and compete elsewhere in Europe (Kingsley, 
2012). 
Denmark’s innovative clusters are accredited to being leaders in the industry and research 
areas such as as green technology, biotechnology, pharmaceutical sciences, telecommunications, 
IT and design. Furthermore, the Danish government does not want to simply maintain its present 
position, but to create one of the leading knowledge societies in the world. In order to realize such 
a national target, the government decided to establish a combined Ministry for Science, 
Technology, and Innovation, which focuses on scientific discoveries, digital networks, 
technological service, and human resources (Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation, 
2002). Denmark has a number of innovative networks and clusters that work to promote growth 
and innovation nationally or regionally. These clusters give companies access to the knowledge 
and the entrepreneurs who can inspire, raise ideas for prospective business, solve global 
problems, and gain funding. 
An innovative cluster can be characterized by a set of traits that are recognized by the 
Cluster Excellence of Denmark as being; the aim to build knowledge bridges between companies 
and institutions and to create innovation and growth within a group of companies with shared 
interests, institutions and public partners/civil society take an active part, have a formally 
established organization of the cluster and its activities with the resources to offer services and 
activities to the members, and the aim is a long-term, sustainable effort. In Denmark, cluster 
studies have become in recent years the cornerstone of the business and industry policy making. 
High-tech clustering in Denmark reflects the the quality of financial services, the technological 
spillover, and the entrepreneurial competition between firms. Maskell and Malmberg (1999) 
explained that proximity in the cluster could create a deep village atmosphere, where trust 
relations can be formed and utilized for sustainable knowledge creation. Maskell (2001) pointed 
out that competition between firms in a cluster stimulates entrepreneurial spirit and reinforces 
productivity (Park, 2005). The evolution of Denmark’s innovation clusters thus relied heavily on 
the interconnections of local, social and technical networks and as well as their own individual 
activities for competition and growing innovation. 
 Denmark’s innovation clusters resemble to a much greater degree than in Finland the 
inclusive and decentralized networks Saxenian asserts attributed to the success of the Silicon 
Valley region. Like the West Coast region, Denmark adopted decentralized organizational 
systems in which firms specialized and competed intensely, but while still collaborated in 
informal and local institutions to gain insight about changing markets and technologies. Focusing 
in on one of Denmark’s most dynamic high-tech companies reinforces the notion of Denmark as a 
Silicon Valley-type of innovative center.  
Case Study: Coloplast 
The analysis of the Coloplast Corporation’s growth and innovation policies allows for 
further comparison of Saxenian’s Silicon Valley and Denmark and, in further contrast to 
Finland’s Nokia, further solidifies Denmark’s linkage to the postmodern world. Coloplast is a 
Danish multinational corporation, founded in 1957, and operates in the med-tech industry, 
increasing its market share in its three main business areas: ostomy-related products, incontinence 
products and wound care products. Coloplast also deals in breast care products aimed at women 
who have been operated for breast cancer and skin treatment products. The corporation 
continuously works on developments of user- and skin-friendly adhesives and products, which are 
considered their core technologies. These technologies, most of which have been around for less 
than 4 years, have accounted for 32% of generated sales. Coloplast is a leading developer of 
adhesives for attaching plastic products to human skin, including user-friendly packaging, which 
makes self-application easier for patients. Below is a table showing the growth of Coloplast 
throughout the 1990s, moving into the 2000’s: 
 
 
  
Coloplast's production facilities are characterized by a decentralized, loose and informal 
organizational structure that proved to be quite successful, being recognized by Forbes magazine 
consistently as a leader in innovation and multinational performance. Not only has Coloplast 
focused largely on research and development in both new products and enriching their product 
portfolio, but Coloplast has also created an online community of healthcare providers in efforts 
for collaborative learning and shared knowledge. It thus closely resembles the regional corporate 
culture of Saxenian’s Silicon Valley. Also reflecting a postmodernist mind-set of wide-spread, 
efficient and flexible operations, Coloplast leverages its widespread health-care network using 
advanced communications technology. In particular, Coloplast is oriented towards creating and 
maintaining relationships with healthcare professionals, particularly nurses, as a means of 
ensuring the loyalty and involvement of those it believes has key influences on matters relating to 
postoperative patient care. Coloplast regards its relationships with patients and nurses, together 
with its ability in adhesive technology, as the company's core assets. As pointed out by Lars 
Rasmussen, Corporate Director at Coloplast: “In essence our ability to involve nurses by initiating 
and developing relationships is our core asset: much [as with any flexible production system] we 
are focused on positioning ourselves centrally or develop our relations to those nurses 
professionally involved in ostomy or spinal care” (Houman Andersen, 2004). Coloplast’s 
web-enhanced community provide a natural continuation of the organization's strong focus on 
developing relationships and exchange ideas and knowledge. As a result, Coloplast has not only 
developed a community of collaboration, but in-depth knowledge of differing global healthcare 
systems, giving them a competitive advantage in the market. 
Coloplast therefore, has not only focused and excelled in quality products, but has 
distinguished themselves from competitors through strong commitments to helping healthcare 
providers administer better patient care, and like Silicon Valley, developed stronger commitments 
to one another and to the cause of advancing technology and care than to individual companies or 
industries. The case study of Coloplast indicates a strong emphasis on external involvement in 
innovation processes. Through such a geographically wide-ranging network of healthcare 
specialists, the company has the flexibility to hand a wide range of healthcare-related issues and 
situations and do so in a highly efficient manner.  This modus operandi contrasts quite sharply 
with the self-contained, rigid focus on one product that we have seen characterized Nokia. Thus 
we see that Denmark’s high-tech-cluster communities and our case study of Coloplast reinforce 
the notion of Denmark’s post-modernist approach to innovation –so characteristic of Silicon 
Valley, and an approach that allows it to move ahead technologically with a speed and assurance 
that Finland is having trouble matching. As we did for Finland, it is now useful to dig a bit deeper 
into Denmark’s cultural psyche to better understand the country’s ability to embrace 21​st​ century 
postmodernism to a degree that surpasses Finland.  
 Application of AnnaLee Saxenian’s ​Regional Advantage:​ Denmark & Silicon 
Valley 
The natural boundaries of a peninsula, whether it be the relatively narrow stretch of land 
by the Baltic Sea or the land hemmed in by the San Francisco Bay and Santa Cruz mountains, 
ensured a density of development that minimized physical distance between companies and 
facilitated intensive informal communications in both regions of the Silicon Valley and Denmark. 
Drawn together by the challenge of geographic and technological frontiers, both environments 
created a culture that transcended form and function. They developed less formal social 
relationships and collaborative traditions that support experimentation. Both regions promote 
collective learning and flexible adjustment among specialist producers of complex technologies. 
The dense social networks and homogeneous work settings have encouraged experimentation and 
entrepreneurship (Saxenian, 2005).  
The promotion of risk taking and informal relationships in Denmark are prevalent in the 
professional cultures of the workplace and further demonstrate similarities to Saxenian’s 
collaborative and communal Silicon Valley. As noted, ​Silicon Valley’s business culture highly 
supports experimentation, encourages risk and accepts failure ​(Saxenian, 2005)​. ​The 
comparability in risk avoidance, also sometimes called uncertainty ​avoidance, also contributes to 
fostering innovation within each region. ​Risk avoidance is defined as the extent to which society 
embraces ambiguity, or as defined by Robert House’s, GLOBE Study, as the “extent to which 
members of collectives seek orderliness, consistency, structure, formulated procedures, and laws 
to cover situations in their daily lives.” Both regions can be classified as having very low risk 
avoidance.  
Risk acceptance is reflected in the way the Danes are comfortable with changing plans and 
low predictivity, these aspects being recognized as a natural part of work life. Employees are not 
given the explicit step-by-step processes or duties that are often seen in American job functions, 
but are trusted to complete their work with room for creativity and freedom to test their own 
ideas. In an interview with Danish employee Hanni Niclasen, who works with a financial firm 
right outside the city of Copenhagen, the decentralized and trusting business culture can be 
interrupted as: 
Scary working environment to have the feeling that nobody is telling you 
exactly what to do and what is correct and what is wrong. But nobody will 
hammer you if you make mistakes. It's called constructive criticism in the 
Nordics.  You see, the locals also work in a structured way, you have to, but 
we earn enormous trust from management in our abilities. This is the norm 
through all of Denmark. We are well educated and if we fail to produce 
requirements it will show and then you must do better. I would suffocate and 
feel like a child if I had to ask my boss for his acceptance and approval all the 
 time. In my role, I enjoy enormous trust from my boss who is located in 
Stockholm, Sweden, but at the same time he and the company expects me to 
work within my role in a structured and efficient way to reach not only what I 
am measured up against but also to be a valuable contributor to my team. We 
monitor and measure our performance quite often (Niclasen, personal 
communication, 2016).  
The layout of office space also reflects on the values of the egalitarian society and 
resemble the work spaces of Silicon Valley’s Intel Corporation. Work spaces often lack dividing 
walls and employees are seated together, regardless of rank. There are usually a few conference 
spaces where employees can go if they need a little more privacy, but otherwise all employees are 
easily accessible through an open layout. This strategic arrangement of the office allows for all 
forms of management to be approachable and open to discussion among employees. The office 
design eliminates the traditional boundaries between employers and employees, and between 
corporate functions within firms, and creates interdependent teams that are linked by informal 
communications that mirror the country’s decentralized industrial structure (Saxenian, 2005). 
Effective managers and executives themselves are supportive of the staff and involve them 
through collective decision making, striving for consensus and solidarity, and partaking in long 
discussions until conflicts are resolved by compromise and negotiation.  
These ideals are implemented even in the most mundane of activities. For example during 
the lunch hours in Danish offices, the designated meal areas oftentimes designed so that 
colleagues must sit together in a central plaza that occupies multiple corporations, enabling 
inter-industry and local relationships. In cultivating a place for collaborative comp​etition in the 
work environment, employees have the allocated time and space to brainstorm new ideas to 
improve the company and to develop commitments to one another. ​The informal socializing that 
grows out these quasi-personal relationships support the ubiquitous practices of collaboration and 
the sharing of information among colleagues (Saxenian, 2005). ​The decentralized environment 
forges employees who can recognize the different problems the industry faces by interacting with 
a variety of backgrounds in the workplace​. 
Here, the Danish Law of Jante intertwines with the discussion of collaboration, 
contributing​ to the application of Saxenian in Denmark. Within the ideologies of the Jante Law, 
the concept that no individual is above anyone else promotes cooperation as a collective. A 
conversation that took place at a Danish lunch plaza further illustrates the connection of 
communal participation in the egalitarian work culture. In the discussion with a female employee 
about her child’s recent soccer tournament, she expressed that even though her child was playing 
in what was classified as a competition, the score was not recorded for the game and the players 
all received medals afterwards. This leads naturally to the follow-up question, “But then how does 
anyone win?” The answer was everyone did because all teams were viewed as equal (Sollund, 
personal communication, 2016). This form of communal-based engagement fosters a different 
strategy of competition through equality, one that is focused on team building and not of 
 advancing in a hierarchy. The ideas of equality and community impressed on Danish children 
follow them into the working world. Brainstorming and pitching new ideas becomes easier if 
employees feel that they can truly explore their thoughts and objectives despite rank or status, 
resulting in employees that feel appreciated and valued and contribute more to the company 
(Srivastava, 2011). The collaborative and egalitarian environment Denmark has established 
largely mirrors the practices and ideals of Saxenian’s Silicon Valley. 
Inclusive networking through informal relationships and openness in the workplace are 
values both Silicon Valley and Denmark embody. Their geographical proximity promotes the 
repeated interaction and the mutual trust needed to sustain collaboration and to speed the 
continued recombination of technology and skill. When production is embedded in these regional 
social structures and institutions, firms compete by translating local knowledge and relationships 
into innovative products and services; and industrial specialization becomes a source of flexibility 
rather than of atomism and fragmentation (Saxenian, 2005). Both Silicon Valley and Denmark 
continue to reinvent themselves they learn collectively and adjust collaboration in efforts to 
enhance innovation and growth.  
Chapter 5: Conclusion   
 The study began with idea that revolutions can be sudden and immediately devastating 
(e.g. political revolutions) or they can be more incremental, gradual so that the old and new can 
exist side by side for many years and even beyond (e.g. intellectual revolutions). We have seen 
this is true in the case of the postmodernism revolution and the application of AnnaLee 
Saxenian’s ​Regional Advantage​. ​ ​Even in one region of Scandinavia, remnants of the old style 
modernism (Fordism) exist along with postmodernist tendencies. The case of Denmark and 
Finland serves as excellent example of this concept.  Both countries show evidence of both types 
of systems –modernist and post-modernist. In this sense both countries have one foot in the 20​th 
century one foot in the 21​st​ centuries.But what is also important is the degree to which a country is 
committed to one century or the other.  We have seen that Denmark is much more accepting of 
the ethos of the present century while Finland is committed more to the Fordist mentality of the 
past century. This correlation between a country’s commitment to post Fordism and its ability to 
innovate in this present century is a powerful relationship, for it allows us to actually predict a 
country’s, or region’s innovative capacity within the 21​st​ century.  To put it blanently, being 
“modern” (in the way we have used the term throughout this paper) is fine but only up to a point: 
as this century proceeds, not moving beyond “modern” will leave a country far behind in global 
innovative capability.  A country must be willing and able to cross the threshold between 
modernism and postmodernism and embrace the latter if it hopes to remain technologically 
relevant in the coming decades. Certainly, the case of Finland’s Nokia is a warning to other 
nations that being rooted in the past is a potent way to become irrelevant.  Denmark and Coloplast 
are the more dynamic players that show what benefits the dynamic embrace of the world as it is – 
or is rapidly becoming—  can bring. 
 As we have seen, it is history and culture that determines a country’s willingness and 
ability to be static (“modern”) or dynamic (“postmodern”).  And this is important, for by studying 
a country’s cultural roots, we might explain –and possibly even predict—which direction a 
country or company might go –whether it will be static or dynamic—and therefore how 
innovative it might be. Finland and Denmark are two countries with very different histories and 
cultures, but history and culture goes beyond whether or not they can innovate, but can adapt. 
This, Saxenian asserts how a country or region will succeed in a flat and culturally flexible 
globalized world. 
At the same time, just because a region, country or company is today moving ahead –or 
moving backward—does not mean they cannot change directions in one way or the other. 
Finland may in fact prove its mettle as an innovator, at some point. We have seen it has in its 
history, culture and institutions more than a dollop of 21​st​ century thinking; these “hooks” may 
only need some nurturing by government, universities and industry to set Finland on the path 
from modern to post-modern.  Then too, a prototypical, postmodern society like Silicon Valley is 
not immune to backsliding, especially as it has grown “fat and happy” and loses its taste for 
globalization and the radical innovation that such postmodernist thinking can bring.  There are 
indeed such signs in the Valley from startups to venture capitalists that rigidities and the mass 
production of one standardized thing can be quite attractive – this is especially true as the costs to 
develop new generations of chips continue to explode.  Better then perhaps to focus on the last 
profitable component and work it to death as a mass produced commodity.  Time will tell if the 
Valley can continue to serve as the post-modernist model that it has for the last couple of decades. 
Finally, there is the question one cannot yet answer:  Is there a revolution on the horizon 
that will overtake postmodernism, a revolution perhaps that will be ushered into society by the 
rise of nanotechnology?  We simply do not know at the present. But if there is, will those regions 
and countries that have proven so adept at sliding out of one system into another be equally fluid 
in embracing the new nano-order of innovation and production? What indeed the global order will 
look like if such a revolution comes into focus is a great unknown, as is the case with the 
emergence of any new and as yet unexplored intellectual frontier​.  
 
 
 
  
 References  -APA- 
Acemoglu Aghion & Zilibotti 2006: Distance to Frontier, Selection, and Economic Growth. J. of 
the European Economic Association, 4, 37–74.  
Assadi, B., Pirinen, M., & Tajha, K. (October-January, 2016- 2017). ​Office Revolution 
[Photograph]. Photography at Work, Employment Museum at Virka Gallery, Helsinki. 
 Virka Gallery’s summer exhibition Photography at Work explores work and working in 
Helsinki. Photographers Behrang Assadi, Miikka Pirinen and Katja Tajha provide three 
different perspectives on today’s working life. What can modern offices look like? How is 
work at an open prison? Or what kind of things can a pause include? The exhibition also 
includes photographs and videos collected in the Gallery’s open photography and video 
competition arrange from 1 October 2016 to 31 January 2017. The competition attracted 
almost 350 entries. They offer an individual view to work sites, offices, the everyday of a 
freelancer or, for instance, a single parent’s day off. What do we mean when we say 
‘work’? The exhibition tries to find answers and also raises questions about what work is 
like today in Helsinki. 
Assadi, B., Pirinen, M., & Tajha, K. (October-January, 2016- 2017). ​Light of 
Statistics​[Photograph]. Work in Helsinki, Employment Museum at Virka Gallery, 
Helsinki. 
Bathelt, H., Malmberg, A. & Maskell, P. (2004). Clusters and knowledge: Local buzz, global 
pipelines 
and the process of knowledge creation. Progress in Human Geography 28:1, 31–56. 
Bremen, & Dresden. (2017, August 19). Germany's new divide. Retrieved March 05, 2018, from 
https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21726705-its-election-campaign-kicks-germany
s-north-south-split-ever-starker-germanys-new-divide 
Catalogue of clusters and innovative networks in Denmark (Rep.). (n.d.). Retrieved March 8, 
2018, from Cluster Excellence Denmark website: 
file:///C:/Users/Owner/Downloads/Catalogue of clusters and networks 20052016.pdf 
Coloplast on the Forbes Top Multinational Performers List. (2017, May). Retrieved April 03, 
2018, from https://www.forbes.com/companies/coloplast/ 
Cultural Advice. (2005). 105-107. 
Denend, Les. 3Com Corp., interview by Saxenian, Oct. 13, 1990 
De Luque, Mary S., and Mansour Javidan. "Uncertainty Avoidance." Culture, Leadership, and 
Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publ., 
2014. 602-53. Print. 
Doz, Y., & Kosonen, M. (2008). The Dynamics of Strategic Agility: NOKIA'S 
ROLLERCOASTER EXPERIENCE. California Management Review, 50(3), 95-118. 
Dutta, S., Lanvin B., & Wunsch-Vincent S. (Eds.), (2017). The Global Innovation Index 2017: 
Innovation Feeding the World. Geneva: Cornell University, Instead, WIPO. 
 Edquist & Hommen 2008: Comparing National Systems of Innovation in Asia and Europe: 
Theory and Comparative Framework. In Edquist & Hommen (Eds.), Small Country 
Innovation Systems: Globalization, Change and Policy in Asia and Europe (1–28). 
Edward Elgar. 
European Union. (2018, March 2). Denmark - European Union - European Commission. 
Retrieved March 05, 2018, from 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/denmark_en 
European Union. (2018, March 2). Finland - European Union - European Commission. Retrieved 
March 05, 2018, from 
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries/finland_en 
European Innovation Scoreboard 2016 - Finland​ (p. 72, Rep.). (2016). Retrieved April 17, 2018, 
from file:///C:/Users/Owner/AppData/Local/Temp/7zO02C68626/Finland.pdf. 
Finnish Forest Association. (n.d.). Finnish forests resources. Retrieved June 05, 2017, from 
https://www.smy.fi/en/forest-fi/forest-facts/finnish-forests-resources/ 
Grobart, S. (2013, September 20). Apple CEO Tim Cook's Complete Interview With Bloomberg 
Businessweek. Retrieved April 01, 2018, from 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-09-20/apple-ceo-tim-cooks-complete-inte
rview-with-bloomberg-businessweek 
Hollanders, H., Es-Sadki N., & Kanerva, M.., (2016). European Innovation Scoreboard. Retrieved 
May 29, 2017, from 
http://www.knowledgetransferireland.com/About_KTI/Reports-Publications/European-In
novation-Scoreboard-2016.pdf 
Hofstede, G. (2011). Dimensionalizing Cultures: The Hofstede Model in Context. Online 
Readings in Psychology and Culture, 2(1).​ http://dx.doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1014 
House, Robert J. "Uncertainty Avoidance, Table 19.1." Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: 
The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: SAGE Publ., 2014. 603-20. 
Print. 
Houman Andersen, P. (2004, October 07). Relationship marketing and brand involvement of 
professionals through web-enhanced brand communities: The case of Coloplast. Retrieved 
April 10, 2018, from 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0019850104000732 
Huy, Q., & Vuori, T. (2014). What could have saved Nokia, and what can other companies learn? 
Read more at http:// 
knowledge.insead.edu/strategy/what-could-have-saved-nokiaand-what-can-other-compani
es-learn-3220?nopaging5 1#7wlyuPX9RREjfSp1.99, Vol. 2014. Insead: INSEAD. 
Source originally from: LAAMANEN, T., LAMBERG, J., & VAARA, E. (2016). 
Explanations of Success and Failure in Management Learning: What CanWe Learn From 
Nokia's Rise and Fall?. Academy Of Management Learning & Education, 15(1), 2-25. 
doi:10.5465/amle.2013.0177 
 The Human Development Index 2016. (2016). Retrieved June 04, 2017, from 
http://www.nationsonline.org/oneworld/human_development.htm 
The Innovation Policy Platform. (2016). Denmark: STI Country Outlook 2016 Profile. Retrieved 
April 23, 2018, from https://www.innovationpolicyplatform.org/content/denmark 
Itim International. (n.d.). Geert Hofstede. Retrieved June 06, 2017, from 
https://geert-hofstede.com/denmark.html 
Jackson Turner, F. (1893). The Significance of the Frontier in American History. 
doi:10.4324/9781912281664 
The Innovation Policy Platform (n.d.). How can innovation contribute to socio-economic 
development?. Retrieved March 05, 2018, from 
https://www.innovationpolicyplatform.org/content/how-can-innovation-contribute-socio-e
conomic-development 
Kingsley, P. (2012). How to be Danish: a journey to the cultural heart of Denmark. New York: 
Marble Arch Press. 
Laamenen, T., Lamberg, J., & Vaara, E. (2016). Explanations of Success and Failure in 
Management Learning: What CanWe Learn From Nokia's Rise and Fall?. Academy Of 
Management Learning & Education, 15(1), 2-25. doi:10.5465/amle.2013.0177 
Laamenen, T., Lamberg, J., & Vaara, E. (2016). Explanations of Success and Failure in 
Management Learning: What CanWe Learn From Nokia's Rise and Fall?. Graph. 
Explanations of Success and Failure in Management Learning: What Can We Learn From 
Nokia's Rise and Fall?. Academy of Management Learning & Education, Mar2016, Vol. 
15 Issue 1, p2-25, 24p, 3 Charts, 4 Graph; found on p6. Retrieved April 14, 2018, from 
Academic Search Premier database. 
Lamberg, J.-A., Laukia, A., & Ojala, J. (2014). The anatomy and causal structure of a corporate 
myth: Nokia by the book. Management & Organizational History, 9 (3), 235-255. 
doi:10.1080/17449359.2013.862013 
Legislative Council Secretariat. (2014, September 2). Innovation and technology industry in 
Finland. Retrieved April 1, 2018, from 
http://www.legco.gov.hk/research-publications/english/1314fsc41-innovation-and-technol
ogy-industry-in-finland-20140902-e.pdf 
Makkonen, T., & Inkinen, T. (2014). Spatial scaling of regional strategic programmes in Finland: 
A qualitative study of clusters and innovation systems. Norwegian Journal Of Geography, 
68(4), 216-227. doi:10.1080/00291951.2014.924551 
Marketwired. (2014, April 25). Silicon Valley Stands for Innovation. Marketwire. 
Maskell P (2001) Towards a knowledge-based theory of the geographical cluster. Indust Corp 
Change 10(4):919–941 
Maskell P (2004) Learning in the village economy of Denmark. In: Cook P, Heidenreich M, 
Braczyk H-J (eds) Regional innovation system. Routledge, London, pp 154–187 
Meyer, E. (2014). The Culture Map. New York: Public Affairs. 
 Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (2002) The ministry of science, technology and 
innovation: roles and functions. MOSTI, Copenhagen. 
Nelson, R. R. (1992). ​National Innovation Systems: A Retrospective on a Study​ (Publication). 
New York, NY: Oxford University Press. doi:http://icc.oxfordjournals.org 
Niclasen, H. (2016, November 21). Danish Business Relations with Asset Sales Specialist at DLL 
Financial Solutions Partner [Personal interview by author]. 
OECD (2010), "Addressing global and social challenges through innovation", in The OECD 
Innovation Strategy: Getting a Head Start on Tomorrow, OECD Publishing. doi: 
10.1787/9789264083479-8-en 
OECD (2012), “Innovating for global and societal challenges”, in OECD Science, Technology 
and Industry Outlook 2012, OECD, Paris. doi: 10.1787/sti_outlook-2012-en 
OECD. (2016). PISA 2015 . Retrieved June 4, 2017, from 
https://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisa-2015-results-in-focus.pdf 
Oy, E. (2009). ​Evaluation of the Finnish National Innovation System​ (pp. 1-2, Rep.). Ministry of 
Employment and the Economy. Retrieved April 17, 2018, from 
file:///C:/Users/Owner/AppData/Local/Temp/7zO8C24D60F/Evaluation of the Finnish 
National Innovation System.pdf. 
Parna, O., & Von Tunzelmann, N. (2007). ​Innovation in the Public Sector: Key Features 
Influencing the Development and Implementation of Technologically Innovative Public 
Sector Services in the UK, Denmark, Finland and Estonia​(pp. 109-125, Rep.). IOS Press. 
Petlzer, Doug, Chips and Technologies, interview by Saxenian, Aug. 7, 1990. 
PESTLE analysis. Denmark Country Profile [serial online]. January 2008;:12-30. Available from: 
EBSCO MegaFILE, Ipswich, MA. Accessed May 29, 2017. 
PESTLE analysis. (2008). Finland Country Profile, 11-31. Available from: EBSCO MegaFILE, 
Ipswich, MA. Accessed May 29, 2017. 
Roos, G., Fernstrom, L., & Gupta, O. (2005). ​National Innovation Systems: Finland, Sweden, & 
Australia Compared: Learning for Australia​ (pp. 3-34, Publication). London: Intellectual 
Capital Services. 
Sandemose, A. (1933). En Flyktning Krysser Sitt Spor (A Fugitive Crosses His Tracks). 
Saxenian, A. (1995, November 10-11). Creating a Twentieth Century Technical Community: 
Frederick Terman‘s Silicon Valley. Retrieved March 8, 2018, from 
http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~anno/Papers/terman.html 
Paper prepared for inaugural symposium on The Inventor and the Innovative Society, The 
Lemelson Center for the Study of Invention and Innovation, National Museum of 
American History, Smithsonian Institution 
Park, S., & Lee, S. (2005, September 06). ​The innovation system and regional growth strategy in 
Denmark​(Publication). doi:10.1007/s00146-005-0335-4 
Saxenian, A. (2005). Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 
128. New York: ACLS History E-Book Project. 
 Sabel & Saxenian (2008). A Fugitive Success – Finland’s Economic Future. Sitra Reports 80. 
Schwab, K. (2017). The Global Competitiveness Report 2017-2018 (Rep.) (X. Sala-i-Martín, 
Ed.). World Economic Forum. 
Smith, A. (1776). An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. London: 
Pickering. 
Smith, P. (2013, September 09). The Nokia insider who knows why it failed warns Apple it could 
be next. Retrieved April 01, 2018, from 
http://www.afr.com/technology/the-nokia-insider-who-knows-why-it-failed-warns-apple-i
t-could-be-next-20130906-jh3iz 
Source originally from: LAAMANEN, T., LAMBERG, J., & VAARA, E. (2016). 
Explanations of Success and Failure in Management Learning: What CanWe Learn From 
Nokia's Rise and Fall?. Academy Of Management Learning & Education, 15(1), 2-25. 
doi:10.5465/amle.2013.0177 
Sollund, B. (2016). Denmark Business Relations with Recovery Nordics, DLL. [Personal 
interview]. 
Srivastava, N., & Nair, S. K. (2011). Androgyny and Rational Emotive Behaviour as Antecedents 
of Managerial Effectiveness. Vision (09722629), 15(4), 303-314. 
doi:10.1177/097226291101500401 
Transparency International (2016). Corruption Perceptions Index 2016. Retrieved June 04, 2017, 
from 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table 
Terzić, L. (2017). The Role of Innovation in Fostering Competitiveness and Economic Growth: 
Evidence from Developing Economies. Comparative Economic Research, 20(4), 65-81. 
doi:10.1515/cer-2017-0028 
Todd interview, Feb. 2 1988 
World Economic Forum, (2017). The Global Gender Gap Report 2016. Retrieved June 5, 2017, 
from 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GGGR16/WEF_Global_Gender_Gap_Report_2016.pdf 
  
 Appendix 
 
 
  
